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 Bush v. Gore1 is not defensible doctrinally. The opinion is unsound 
on a number of grounds, including equal protection,2 standing,3 po-
litical question,4 and remedies.5 Indeed, the lack of doctrinal founda-
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. I am indebted to 
Anna Pond and Keith Goodwin for their research assistance. I would also like to thank 
Walter Dellinger and Evan Caminker for their helpful suggestions at the time that I was 
beginning my research into this project. I should point out that neither agrees with the po-
sition taken in this Essay. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650 (2001) 
(“[T]he newly articulated equal protection doctrine is dramatically wide-reaching. . . . The 
difficulty in defining the scope of this new equal protection right is made all the worse by 
the Court’s disingenuous limiting instruction.”); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the 
New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 691 (2001).  
All [the Court] found legally wrong was that the intent-of-the-voter standard—
[the Court] thought unnecessarily—allows different honest counters, or groups 
of them, to make different dispositions of identical ballots, on a basis that is ut-
terly random with respect to voter interest. No one’s equal dignity is impugned 
by this practice, and only Humpty Dumpty would describe it as valuing one 
person’s vote over another’s. 
Id.  
 3. See Note, Non Sub Homine? A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Elec-
tion 2000, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2170, 2189 (2001).  
The [Bush v. Gore] majority may have implicitly carved out an exception to 
equal protection standing requirements that is applicable only to a presidential 
election contest. The lack of explicit inferences from prior law and the failure to 
distinguish the question of due process for candidates from that of equal protec-
tion for voters are weaknesses in the opinion.  
Id. 
 4. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 686 (noting that the Court could have “proper[ly], 
honorabl[y]” abstained from intervention by treating the matter as a political question); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 760 (“This was not techni-
cally a ‘political question,’ but it did not seem to be the kind of question that would warrant 
Supreme Court involvement, certainly not at this preliminary stage.”).  
 5. See Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 651.  
 Bush v. Gore is entirely lacking in such analysis [of remedies]. The Court pre-
sumed that once it found the federal interest, its remedial obligations followed. 
In this regard, the Court’s reliance on the magic December 12 date for the safe 
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tion in the opinion is so transparent that even the case’s few defend-
ers tend to rest on the grounds offered by the concurrence rather 
than the majority.6 
 Bush v. Gore also does not neatly fit within the Court’s traditional 
approach to constitutional principles of federalism and separation of 
powers. The opinion gives little or no regard to the state court’s con-
struction of its own law and little or no deference to the constitu-
tional provisions that delegate the resolution of electoral disputes of 
the type at issue in the case to the Congress and not to the courts. 
 Not surprisingly, these doctrinal and theoretical weaknesses have 
led numerous observers to roundly condemn the opinion. These aca-
demic attacks, even if accurate, however, may fundamentally mis-
conceive what the case was truly about. Bush v. Gore cannot be un-
derstood as about legal doctrine. Rather, it is a case that tests the 
limits of the Court’s ability to go beyond traditional legal analysis to 
achieve what it deems to be a just result—a case that attempts to 
achieve what others have dubbed “rough justice.”7 Seen in this light, 
the fact that the Court did not follow traditional analysis in order to 
                                                                                                                    
harbor under 3 U.S.C. § 5 is particularly ironic. This statutory provision 
emerged from a rather deliberate congressional effort to provide for orderly 
resolution of presidential election controversies in the wake of the hastily-
crafted Electoral Commission approach from 1877. A review of this statute, 
however, reveals that it carefully reserved to the political branches the key role 
in resolving contested presidential elections. 
Id.; David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 
740 (2001) (“What does seem indefensible is the Court’s remedy.”). John C. Yoo, In Defense 
of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 790 (2001).  
[T]he per curiam’s sudden introduction of the December 12 cutoff date for a 
remedy—based on the assumption that the Florida legislature intended to 
adopt the safe harbor date for the selection of presidential electors provided for 
by 3 U.S.C. § 5—makes almost no sense at all unless read in light of the con-
currence’s structural analysis. 
Id. 
 6. See Richard A. Epstein, ‘In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct’: 
The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 634 (2001) (“In sum, there 
is ample reason to believe, as the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore urges, that the 
Florida Supreme Court adopted, under the guise of interpretation, a scheme for conducting 
election challenges that deviates markedly from that which the Florida legislature had set 
out in its statutes.”); Yoo, supra note 5, at 790.  
 This is not to say that the precise reasoning of the per curiam was utterly 
correct. I vastly prefer the theory put forward by the Chief Justice’s concur-
rence: Florida’s judiciary had so re-written the state’s electoral laws that it had 
violated Article II’s delegation of authority to the state legislatures to choose 
the method for selecting presidential electors. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 7. The term “rough justice” has been used by both Richard Posner and Richard Ha-
sen to describe the result in Bush v. Gore. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE 
DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 23 (2001); Richard 
L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 377, 391, 406 (2001). 
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reach its decision is not, taken alone, fatal. Nor is it unprecedented.8 
As we shall see, the Supreme Court, prior to Bush v Gore, had de-
cided cases with little or no reference to established legal principle in 
order to achieve “rough justice.”9 Indeed, in all likelihood, the Su-
preme Court will continue to exercise this power to act when circum-
stances so dictate. 
 The question of whether Bush v. Gore was based on sound legal 
principle thus does not end the inquiry. Even if the decision was not 
doctrinally or theoretically sound, there remains the question of 
whether the Court nevertheless acted illegitimately. This inquiry 
may then be broken down into two sub-parts: 1) Was the Court justi-
fied in intervening in this case to attempt to achieve rough justice? 2) 
If intervention was appropriate, did the Court reach the right result? 
 This Essay addresses these issues. Part I of the paper discusses 
whether Supreme Court intervention to accomplish rough justice in 
this case was warranted. Part II of the paper then addresses the 
question of whether, if judicial intervention was appropriate, the 
Court exercised the power correctly in this case. As will subsequently 
become clear, I conclude that although the Court’s intervention was 
indeed appropriate, it ultimately reached the wrong result in its de-
cision. 
I.   BUSH V. GORE AND ROUGH JUSTICE 
 Imagine the Court believed one of the following: 1) sending the 
election to the Congress would have created a constitutional crisis, 2) 
the Gore forces were improperly manipulating the vote count in order 
to win the election, or 3) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision au-
thorizing the recount to continue was a lawless exercise of judicial 
power intended to achieve a partisan result. If so, would its interven-
tion be justified even if its decision were not based in legal principle? I 
believe the answer to this question is yes. 
 Let me immediately clarify this point. I am not arguing that judi-
cial opinions that do not follow legal principles are examples of good 
or correct legal decisionmaking. Judicial decisions not based in law 
are, by definition, “wrong” jurisprudentially. My point is that the 
conclusion that a case is jurisprudentially wrong does not necessarily 
end all inquiry into a decision’s legitimacy. Occasionally other exi-
gencies may trump jurisprudential purity. Larry Alexander and Fre-
derick Schauer, for example, make this point in reference to Abra-
                                                                                                                    
 8. For example, as my colleague Eric Muller has noted, the Court’s “shock the con-
science” test that it has employed in such cases as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952), may be little more than the Court giving itself license to accomplish rough justice 
under the guise of an announced judicial standard. ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR 
THEIR COUNTRY 154-55 (2001). 
 9. See infra notes 17, 34, and accompanying text. 
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ham Lincoln’s rejection of the rule of law in his suspension of habeas 
corpus: 
If it was important for winning the Civil War that Lincoln suspend 
habeas corpus and infringe on other civil liberties, then the moral 
importance of winning the war was sufficient to justify his actions. 
Reaching this conclusion . . . does not mean that suspending ha-
beas corpus was right. It just means that this wrong was out-
weighed by the greater wrong that would have occurred had the 
war been lost.10 
 Courts, like Presidents, may also understand that right results 
sometimes require something more than pure fealty to law.11 They 
may also realize that exigent circumstances may demand that the 
wrong of ignoring legal principle may be outweighed by the need to 
avoid the harms that would occur if legal principle were studiously 
followed. Certainly for any actor, relying on a nebulous vision of 
rough justice is a dangerous ground to tread. In acting outside tradi-
tional legal boundaries, any actor risks harming its own institutional 
credibility as well as the legitimate expectations of the parties it af-
fects.12 And it may be that because of the specific origins and limits of 
judicial power, the Supreme Court may have less latitude to seek to 
effectuate rough justice than do the other branches.13 But risky or 
not, the power to accomplish rough justice is not alien to the judicial 
role. Certainly, as the next section will demonstrate, there is ample 
precedent for its use. 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 (1997). 
 11. There is certainly ample indication in the Bush v. Gore opinion itself that would 
indicate that the Court well knew that it was not engaging in business as usual. For ex-
ample, the fact that the Court strongly suggested that its equal protection analysis might 
not extend to future cases would seem illustrative of the Court’s intention to attempt to 
reach a specific result only in the case at hand, rather than create new doctrine. See Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of 
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities. 
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of 
their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections. In-
stead, we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to 
assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount . . . .  
Id. 
 12. Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bush v. Gore, of course, makes this very attack 
against the majority opinion: “Although we may never know with complete certainty the 
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is per-
fectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule 
of law.” Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 13. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). Because the 
other branches are subject to electoral control, judicial action raises a countermajoritarian 
difficulty that actions by the Executive and the Congress do not. Id. 
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A.   Bush v. Gore’s Pursuit of Rough Justice Was Not Unprecedented 
 The notion that settled constitutional principles give way in exi-
gent circumstances did not originate with Bush v. Gore. As we have 
already noted, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas cor-
pus14 and also directly rejected controlling Supreme Court authority 
when he resisted Dred Scott15 and issued the Emancipation Procla-
mation.16 Similarly, and more importantly for our purposes, the Su-
preme Court has at times also strayed from strict legal deci-
sionmaking when it believed circumstances so required. Bush v. Gore 
was not the first case in which rough justice rather than legal doc-
trine provided the Supreme Court with its rule of decision.17 The fol-
lowing are but two examples of this exercise. 
1.   New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
 Let me begin controversially by offering one of the most important 
First Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,18 as a primary example of a case de-
cided by rough justice. The facts of Sullivan are well known but de-
serve some repeating. On March 29, 1960, The New York Times ran 
an ad designed to generate support for the civil rights movement en-
titled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”19 The primary thrust of the ad was 
to depict the ongoing struggle between the “thousands of Southern 
Negro students [who were] engaged in widespread non-violent dem-
onstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dig-
nity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights” 
and the “wave of terror” being waged against them by their oppo-
nents.20 Unfortunately, the ad contained a number of inaccuracies. It 
stated, for example, that in connection with a demonstration in 
Montgomery, students had been padlocked in a cafeteria and police 
had ringed the campus where the demonstration had taken place.21 It 
also alleged that Martin Luther King Jr. had been arrested seven 
                                                                                                                    
 14. For a direct comparison of Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and the decision 
in Bush v. Gore, see Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Bush v. Gore: Constitutional-
ist Though Not Constitutional? 9-11 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 15. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 16. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 10, at 1382-83. 
 17. Robert Pushaw, for example, makes the point in this symposium that a similar at-
tempt to achieve rough justice occurred when the Supreme Court entered the election law 
arena in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doc-
trine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 603, 605-11 (2001). 
 18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 19. Id. at 256. 
 20. Id. at 256-57. 
 21. Id. at 258-59.  
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times and had been assaulted.22 In fact, the cafeteria had not been 
padlocked, the police had not ringed the campus, King had been ar-
rested not seven but four times, and King’s claim of being assaulted 
had occurred a number of years earlier.23  
 Based on these inaccuracies, Montgomery Commissioner L.B. Sul-
livan sued The New York Times for defamation. Sullivan’s claim was 
not strong. To begin with, the ad did not explicitly refer to him, and 
there was nothing in its text that would tie him to any of the alleged 
activities. It seemed, therefore, that Sullivan could not meet the ba-
sic requirement of a defamation suit that the alleged matters be “of 
and concerning” the plaintiff.24 Further, it was not clear, in any 
event, that Sullivan’s reputation would in any way be defamed or 
tarnished in his community even if he were deemed to be one of the 
subjects of the ad. Rather, given the spirit of the times, it is more 
likely that his community standing would be improved by the sug-
gestion that he opposed the civil rights demonstration. 
 These matters, however, did not deter the Alabama courts. The 
Alabama jury awarded him damages of $500,000, an exorbitant 
amount at that time in any jurisdiction and an even more outrageous 
amount given that only 394 copies of the Times had been sold in Ala-
bama and only thirty-five had been sold in Montgomery County.25 
 Even before it reached the Supreme Court, it was clear that the 
action brought by Commissioner Sullivan against the Times was no 
mere libel suit. Rather, the case marked a major battle between the 
entrenched racist Southern power structure and the civil rights 
movement. The purpose of the litigation was to chill press efforts to 
cover the civil rights movement, and Sullivan’s initial victory in the 
Alabama courts was a significant step in that direction.26 Not only 
would the $500,000 verdict alone have been crippling to The New 
York Times,27 but there were also numerous other libel suits against 
the newspaper that were in the works at the time the case was de-
cided.28 Yet even more was at issue than simply deterring Northern 
media coverage. Sullivan’s victory signaled that those challenging 
the status quo could expect to suffer considerable legal costs in 
mounting their effort. As Rodney Smolla has explained, “to the ex-
tent that the verdict represented the special antipathy that the 
community of Montgomery, Alabama felt for aggressive blacks and 
                                                                                                                    
 22. Id. at 258.  
 23. Id. at 258-59. 
 24. Id. at 267 (noting that for the plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action in Ala-
bama, a jury must find that the defamatory words were “of and concerning” the plaintiff). 
 25. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 30 (1986). 
 26. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW 34 (1991).  
 27. Id. 
 28. See SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 43-44. 
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their Yankee fellow travelers, it threatened to cripple the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the laws.”29 
 With both press freedom and the civil rights movement at stake, it 
is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court reversed the Ala-
bama court’s decision. However, like Bush v. Gore, New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan was not exactly based upon firm doctrinal footing. In-
stead, the extent to which the decision paved new ground (and dug 
up the old) cannot be overestimated. The following are only some of 
the highlights.  
 To begin with, the decision effectively constitutionalized the law of 
defamation. It removed a traditionally state-bound and state-defined 
common law action from the state courts (and state legislators) into 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Prior to Sullivan, libel law had 
not been thought to raise any First Amendment concern; and had 
traditionally been within the exclusive province of the states. Second, 
the Court’s rule of decision in the case, that a plaintiff could not suc-
ceed in a libel action against a public official unless he could show 
that the defendant acted with “actual malice,” meaning knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,30 was not only wholly un-
precedented in federal law31 but also ignored previous Court state-
ments to the contrary.32 Third, the Court acquitted The New York 
Times even though the facts of the case might still suggest the news-
paper’s actions were subject to liability even under the new actual 
malice standard. The Times apparently had the correct version of the 
events in its files but had not crosschecked the account presented in 
the ad with its own information.33 
 Yet, despite its enormous breadth and consequence, that the 
Court reached the result it did appears virtually inevitable in hind-
sight. As Smolla notes, 
[I]t is clear that the Supreme Court could no more permit southern 
juries in libel trials to punish those who were seeking to snuff out 
the yet unfulfilled promise of Brown v. The Board Of Education, 
than it could permit southern legislation to outlaw or cripple the 
NAACP. The case was arguably more the product of a due process 
deficiency than a First Amendment concern, for against the back-
drop of the period the problem was really one of litigation fairness: 
four black preachers and a New York newspaper simply could not 
get a fair trial in Alabama in 1960 in a case concerning civil rights 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Id. at 35. 
 30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  
 31. The Court relied on the law of a number of selected states in fashioning this stan-
dard. See id. at 280-83. 
 32. Prior to Sullivan, the Court had indicated that the First Amendment did not pro-
tect libel in a number of cases. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 
(1961); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
 33. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287. 
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issues. Had the events surrounding the Sullivan lawsuit not been 
so patently racist, in fact, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court 
would have bothered to hear just another libel suit at all. What 
was not foreordained, however, was that in aid of the civil disobe-
dience tactics of Martin Luther King and his followers, the Su-
preme Court would write an opinion that would forever influence 
the way American law treated freedom of speech.34 
 In short, rough justice, not doctrine, dictated the result in the Sul-
livan case. Libel law, certainly, was forever changed by the decision. 
But that was a result of the Court’s subsequent decisions applying 
Sullivan to later cases—an option which now awaits the Court in its 
future interpretations of Bush v. Gore. The fact that the case would 
eventually enjoy precedential effect was only a by-product of the 
Court’s efforts to achieve rough justice—it was not its cause.35 
2.   Henry v. Mississippi 
 If Sullivan was an example of a rough justice case in which the 
Court would eventually abide by the doctrinal implications of its de-
cision, Henry v. Mississippi 36 was an example of where the doctrine 
created by a rough justice decision would eventually lead nowhere. 
Aaron Henry was the president of both the Coahoma Mississippi 
County Branch of the NAACP and of the NAACP’s State Conference 
of Branches.37 He was convicted in Mississippi of disturbing the 
peace by “indecent proposals to and offensive contact with an 18-
year-old hitchhiker to whom he is said to have given a ride in his 
car.”38 
 The legal issue in Henry involved the application of the adequate 
state ground doctrine, which governs when decisions by a state court 
may be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In the case it-
self, Henry’s attorney had failed to make a contemporaneous objec-
tion to the admission of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.39 
Failure to raise the objection would, under Mississippi law, foreclose 
consideration of the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, but the 
Mississippi Supreme Court initially reached the constitutional issue 
(and reversed the conviction) believing that Henry’s counsel was out-
                                                                                                                    
 34. SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 44-45. 
 35. In fact, Sullivan and its progeny have proved less than successful in fashioning a 
law of defamation that both serves the purposes of the tort while protecting First Amend-
ment interests. See generally William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the 
First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169 (discussing how the rules 
announced in Sullivan and later cases discourage responsible journalism). 
 36. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). 
 37. See Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: 
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 190. 
 38. Henry, 379 U.S. at 444. 
 39. Id. at 445.  
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of-state and not familiar with local procedure.40 After being informed 
by the state, however, that Henry’s counsel was local, the Mississippi 
court reversed its previous decision and held that the constitutional 
issue could not be considered because of failure to comply with the 
appropriate procedure.41 
 The United States Supreme Court reversed again. In an opinion 
generously described by the Hart and Wechsler textbook as “confus-
ing,”42 the Court held: 1) a state rule could not bar consideration of a 
litigant’s federal rights unless the rule served a legitimate state in-
terest;43 2) Mississippi’s contemporaneous objection requirement 
served a legitimate state interest;44 and 3) Mississippi procedure 
allowed litigants to raise a constitutional challenge to the evidence in 
motions for directed verdict at the close of trial, which also served the 
interests of the contemporaneous objection rule by allowing the judge 
to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence and thus avoiding the 
need for a new trial if the claim was meritorious.45 This meant that 
the contemporaneous rule used to bar Henry’s appeal in effect served 
no independent purpose.46 The Court, nevertheless, did not hold that 
Henry’s claim could not be barred because of the ostensible superflu-
ousness of the contemporaneous objection rule. Rather, it held that 
the case should be remanded to determine if Henry’s counsel deliber-
ately did not comply with the procedural rule.47 Why a deliberate 
failure to object should be relevant if such failure itself was not an 
adequate bar to consideration of the legal claim was not explained. 
 Despite its ambiguity, there was much in the Henry decision that, 
if followed, could have dramatically changed the law of the adequate 
state ground. For example, that the adequacy of one procedural rule 
in barring a federal claim could be evaluated by reference to another 
was itself a significant development. Even more broadly, as Justice 
Harlan argued in dissent, the opinion may be read as “portend[ing] a 
severe dilution, if not complete abolition, of the concept of ‘adequacy’ 
as pertaining to state procedural grounds.”48 Similarly, Professor 
Terrance Sandalow, writing shortly after the decision, was also con-
cerned that the opinion suggested the elimination of “the concept of 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 445-46. 
 42. RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 584 (4th. ed. 1996). 
 43. Henry, 379 U.S. at 447. 
 44. Id. at 448. As the Court explained, “By immediately apprising the trial judge of 
the objection, counsel gives the court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using the 
tainted evidence. If the objection is well taken the fruits of the illegal search may be ex-
cluded from jury consideration, and a reversal and new trial avoided.” Id. 
 45. Id. at 448-49.  
 46. See id.  
 47. Id. at 451-53. 
 48. Id. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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adequacy so far as state procedural grounds are concerned [a devel-
opment which would ignore] the interests of both the litigants and 
the judicial system in orderly procedure.”49 
 Sandalow, however, also foresaw another explanation of the 
Court’s opinion. 
 Of all the problems raised by Henry, none is more trouble-some 
than that of determining the material facts. Almost the first lesson 
taught in law school is that “facts of person, time, [and] place . . . 
are presumably immaterial unless stated [by the court] to be ma-
terial. As a rule the law is the same for all persons, at all times, 
and at all places within the jurisdiction of the court.” Yet, even 
though not mentioned by the Court, is it really immaterial that the 
petitioner was not merely a man charged with disturbing the 
peace, but Aaron Henry, a Negro resident of Clarksdale, Missis-
sippi, and president of both the Coahoma County Branch of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and of 
its State Conference of Branches? Is it, moreover, immaterial that 
the prosecution was commenced in 1962 in Mississippi and not at 
another time and in another place? The traditional answer to these 
questions, one suspects, is neither entirely realistic nor necessarily 
desirable. Yet more than a lawyer’s conservatism argues for cau-
tion in accepting a conclusion that the Court was or ought to have 
been influenced by such factors, particularly in a case which 
touches what historically has been one of the more sensitive areas 
of federal-state relationships.50 
 Subsequent events appear to have proved Sandalow’s latter ex-
planation to be correct. As one textbook notes, “[d]espite its radical 
potential, the Henry decision has had little effect on the standards 
applied on direct review in judging the adequacy of state procedural 
grounds.”51 The result in Henry, in short, was dictated not by doctrine 
but by “the possibility that Henry’s prosecution was a consequence of 
his active participation in the civil rights movement.”52 Rough justice, 
not the adequate state ground rule, was the governing principle.  
B.   Supreme Court Intervention in Bush v. Gore Was Appropriate 
 The fact that stretching judicial power is not unprecedented, of 
course, does not in itself justify its particular exercise in any given 
case. Moreover, it might quickly be contended that Sullivan and 
Henry are not proper precedents for Bush v. Gore. After all, both 
cases involved protecting civil rights interests against a hostile and 
entrenched political establishment. Sullivan and Henry, therefore, 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Sandalow, supra note 37, at 239. 
 50. Id. at 190 (citations omitted). 
 51. FALLON ET AL., supra note 42, at 585. 
 52. Sandalow, supra note 37, at 196. 
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might be viewed as classic examples of cases in which judicial inter-
vention is most needed—cases in which the political processes cannot 
be trusted to reach fair and just results on their own accord.53 In 
Bush v. Gore, on the other hand, the prevailing litigant was anything 
but politically marginalized and had access to virtually every possi-
ble political weapon. Accordingly, the case for extraordinary judicial 
action is far weaker.54 This is a fair point. Undoubtedly, the courts 
should be especially vigilant when the rights and interests of vulner-
able groups are at stake. This does not mean, however, that extraor-
dinary judicial intervention is inappropriate in all other circum-
stances. Factors other than the identities of the litigants may cry out 
for special judicial action, and certainly if there were such a case, 
Bush v. Gore would clearly have to be at the top of anyone’s list. 
 Consider just some of the amazing confluence of events that sur-
rounded the case. The presidential election depended on the twenty-
five electoral votes of the state of Florida. In the initial vote count in 
Florida, Bush led Gore by 1,784 votes out of a total of over six mil-
lion.55 Outside of Florida, Gore led in electoral votes and had won the 
popular vote.56 
 The Florida Supreme Court, which had authorized a recount to 
occur, was controlled by Democrats.57 The Florida Legislature, which 
was empowered to submit its own slate of delegates, was controlled 
by Republicans.58 
                                                                                                                    
 53. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 54. Of course, if the Court was concerned with protecting the interests of political mi-
norities then maybe it did reach the correct result. After all, the Bush side did receive 
fewer votes. 
 55. Because this margin represented less than one-half of one percent of the total 
number of votes cast, Florida law required a machine recount, which subsequently nar-
rowed Bush’s lead to 930 votes. Following manual recounts ordered by the Florida Su-
preme Court, the final certified tally on November 26 (the date set by the court and twelve 
days after the statutory deadline) found Bush with 2,912,790 votes and Gore with 
2,912,253—a difference of 537. The Florida Supreme Court then allowed late submissions 
from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties, which narrowed Bush’s lead to only 154 
votes. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98, 100-03 (2000); Richard A. Ryan, Bush Declares 
Victory; Gore Contests Results, DET. NEWS, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1. 
 56. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court intervened, Gore held 267 electoral votes to 
Bush’s 246 and 50,158,094 popular votes to Bush’s 49,820,518 (a margin of 337,536). See 
Marc Sandalow, Bush Pledges Unity/Analysis: Partisan Passions Won’t Be Dispelled 
Easily, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2000, at A1. A later Washington Post analysis that accounted 
for late-tallied absentee ballots in all fifty states put Gore’s popular-vote lead at 540,539. 
See Charles Babington, Electors Reassert Their Role; Bush Wins Vote; Protest Costs Gore, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A1. 
 57. All seven members of the court are Democratic appointees (one was jointly ap-
pointed by Lawton Chiles and Jeb Bush). Six are registered Democrats, one a Republican. 
See Lisa Getter & Mitchell Landsberg, America Waits—Florida Top Court is in Glare of 
Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A27. 
 58. Republicans held a 77 to 43 majority in the House and a 25 to 15 majority in the 
Senate, and Democrats openly acknowledged they did not have the votes to stop Republi-
cans from naming a slate of electors. See, e.g., David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Jeb 
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 The Constitution requires that if there are two or more slates of 
electors presented from a given state, the decision of which slate will 
be recognized will be made by the Congress.59 The Republicans con-
trolled the House of Representatives.60 The Senate was divided 50-50, 
but the Democrats would control it for purposes of ruling on an elec-
tion challenge because the extant Vice President, who is empowered 
to cast the tie-breaking vote, was a Democrat.61 That Vice President 
was Gore. Federal law provides that if the Congress cannot agree on 
a slate of electors that decision will devolve to the Governor of the 
state with the contested slate.62 The Governor of Florida was Bush’s 
brother. 
 The one thing that is clear from this scenario is that the voters of 
2000 unknowingly created the definitive blueprint for stalemate. 
Unless any of the political players were to rise above their own parti-
san interest, any decision resulting from this chaos would necessarily 
reek of partisanship and self-dealing. And it was clear that none of 
the players were prepared to abandon their partisan battle stations.63 
Accordingly, any result achieved by either side would necessarily be 
clouded by claims of illegitimacy. 
 Against this background, the United States Supreme Court may 
have been the only institution that could be seen to be sufficiently 
above the partisan fray to achieve a fair result. As John Yoo wrote, 
“the United States Supreme Court may [have been] the only institu-
tion left that enjoy[ed] the legitimacy to bring the partisan struggle 
over the presidential election to a final, if not infallible, conclusion.”64 
                                                                                                                    
Bush Is Said to Be Willing to Sign Bill Ensuring Republican Victory in Florida, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A25. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 60. Following the November elections, 221 Republicans, 211 Democrats, and 2 Inde-
pendents comprised the House. See, e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, David Baumann, & Bill 
Ghent, A House Divided, 32 NAT’L J. 3555 (2000). The score is now 222 to 210 to 2, follow-
ing a mid-June election in Virginia to fill a seat vacated by the March death of an incum-
bent. One Massachusetts seat remains vacant. See, e.g., Tyler Whitley, Forbes Victorious in 
4th, GOP Adds Seat to Majority in House as Lucas Loses Bitter Race by 4 Points, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 20, 2001, at A1. 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 62. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). 
 63. One notable exception was Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska who wrote:  
At some point this prolonged election will come to an end. One man will be de-
clared president. The outcome must be seen as legitimate and honest, so the 
new president has the credibility and validation to lead. Both parties will have 
to come together and work with the president to govern. We cannot shove that 
responsibility aside and wait for better results from another election. The chal-
lenges facing our nation are too great to be deferred. 
Chuck Hagel, The Stakes Are Higher Than a Partisan Victory, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2000, 
at B07. 
 64. John Yoo, The Right Moment for Judicial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at 
A19. 
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 Arguably in fact, the Gore forces may have needed Supreme Court 
intervention even more than the Bush side. The way the battle was 
shaping, a state judicially ordered election resulting in a Gore slate 
of electors would have been met with a slate of Bush electors chosen 
by the Florida Legislature.65 The United States House of Representa-
tives had made clear that it was going to recognize the Bush slate 
and had begun a rhetorical campaign suggesting that any other re-
sult would be akin to a stealing of the election.66 Republican House 
forces had begun a concerted campaign decrying the impermissible 
“judicial activism” of the Democratic Florida Supreme Court67 and 
had made clear that any result not favorable to Bush would be 
treated as fraudulent.68 This strategy set up an inevitable political 
fight for the mantle of legitimacy between the two potential slates, 
and it was a fight that, at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, 
                                                                                                                    
 65. See, e.g., David Barstow, Lawmakers Move Closer to Special Florida Session for 
Naming Bush Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A27; Ronald Brownstein, Rivals Down 
to Heavy Artillery, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A1; Gail Russell Chaddock, Congress Pre-
pares for Plot Twists—if the Electoral College Tally is Ultimately Disputed, Lawmakers 
Could Have a Say in Who’s President, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 22, 2000, at 1; Adam 
Cohen, The Legal Challenges, TIME, Dec. 4, 2000, at 42; Ann McFeatters, Edgy Congress 
Worries Over a Range of What-ifs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 2000, at A8.  
 66. See Dana Milbank, Are We There Yet? Fascism? Theft in Progress? It’s Looking 
Ugly, but the Bonds Won’t Break, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2000, at B01 (citing House Majority 
Whip Tom DeLay’s description of Gore’s recount pursuit as a “theft in progress” and the 
declaration from Christopher Shays, “a normally sober Connecticut Republican,” that 
“[r]eally, what they’re trying to do is steal the election”); Blake Morrison, Recount Rhetoric 
Reminds Some of Impeachment—Observers Concerned that Partisan Charges are “Spin-
ning out of Control,” USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 2000, at A04.  
“This thing is rigged,” Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, declared. “It is a joke on our 
democracy.” And this about Gore from Rep. J.C. Watts, R-Okla. [and Chairman 
of the House Republican Conference]: “This is a candidate who will not win or 
lose honorably but will instead employ the cutthroat tactics that eight years 
under President Clinton have taught him.” 
Id.; McFeatters, supra note 65 (“House Majority Whip Tom DeLay . . . has sent around a 
two-page memo noting that since Republicans control both houses—even though by a scant 
majority—his party could make Bush president by firmly rejecting a state’s electoral votes 
on the basis that members think such votes are tainted.”); Press Release, House Majority 
Leader Dick Armey, Gore Team Will Do Anything to Win (Nov. 22, 2000), available at 
http://www.freedom.gov/library/presidency/gore.asp (“The Florida Legislature has a duty to 
step in and restore honesty and the rule of law to the election process. For the sake of 
America’s democracy, they can do no less.”).  
 67. Press Release, Representative Tom DeLay, DeLay Criticizes Florida Supreme 
Court Decision (Nov. 17, 2000); see also Press Release, Representative Tom DeLay, DeLay 
on Latest Florida Supreme Court Decision: “Blatant and Extraordinary Abuse of Judicial 
Power” (Nov. 21, 2000) (“[A] collection of liberal activists has arbitrarily swept away 
thoughtfully designed statutes ensuring free and fair elections and replaced them with 
their own political opinions.”); Armey, supra note 66 (“[Gore has] enlisted the Florida Su-
preme Court to rewrite the laws of Florida.”).  
 68. See Press Release, Representative Tom DeLay, Statement of Majority Whip Tom 
DeLay on Latest Florida Supreme Court Decision (Dec. 8, 2000) (“The Florida Supreme 
Court has squandered its credibility and violated the trust of the people of Florida in an at-
tempt to manipulate the results of a fair and free election. This judicial aggression must 
not stand.”). 
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the Republicans were winning.69 Polls indicated that most Americans 
believed Bush had prevailed in Florida and that Gore’s reluctance to 
concede was evidence that he was a sore loser.70 Against this back-
ground, the moral authority of the United States Supreme Court may 
have been the only weapon available to the Gore forces to combat 
this campaign.71 A recount based only upon a constantly attacked de-
cision of the Florida Supreme Court might not have been able to give 
the Gore forces the legitimacy they would need to assume the Presi-
dency. The imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court inter-
vention would be critical. 
II.   DID THE COURT REACH THE RIGHT RESULT? 
 Concluding that Supreme Court intervention was appropriate, or 
at least justifiable, does not mean that the Court’s ultimate decision 
was correct. The case must also be made that notions of rough justice 
required a ruling for Bush. 
 As noted earlier, there are at least three concerns that may have 
led the Court to rule for Bush. First, the Court may have believed 
that its decision was necessary to avoid the constitutional crisis that 
would have inevitably occurred had the matter been referred to the 
Congress. Second, the Court may have believed that its intervention 
was necessary because the Gore forces were in effect manipulating 
the vote totals so as to win the election. Third, the Court may have 
felt its intervention necessary to reverse an ill-advised state court 
decision. These arguments are discussed below. 
A.   The Ruling for Bush Was Necessary to Avoid 
a Constitutional Crisis 
 The exigency of intervening to avoid the political chaos that might 
follow if the matter were referred to the Congress has, as discussed 
above, obvious appeal.72 The stalemate created by the election was 
                                                                                                                    
 69. See William Safire, The Coming Together, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A39. 
 70. An NBC News poll conducted on November 27, 2000, by Robert Teeter, a Republi-
can pollster, and Peter Hart, a Democratic pollster, found nearly sixty percent of those 
polled believe that Bush won; while the poll was evenly split on whether Gore should con-
cede immediately. Nearly half of those polled were more likely to find Gore’s legal appeals 
symptomatic of a “sore loser” than of a candidate pursuing reasonable action. A USA To-
day/CNN poll taken the following day found that thirty-six percent of Gore supporters—a 
new high at the time—were ready for the Vice President to concede. See Bill Lambrecht, 
Polls Showing Loss of Support for Gore Are Coming Under Fire: Pollsters Say Many People 
Aren’t Offered Choices on What They Really Believe, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 
2000, at A7. 
 71. See Yoo, supra note 64, at A19; see also Brownstein, supra note 65, at A1 (citing 
observations by Harvard’s Heather Gerken and the Brookings Institution’s Thomas Mann 
that the Court “may be the one institution with enough prestige to impose a widely ac-
cepted solution on the controversy”). 
 72. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
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not likely to lead to any result that would be free of claims of foul and 
illegitimacy, and the Supreme Court may have been the only institu-
tion with enough authority to impose a result that would have more 
than partisan acceptance. 
 This does not mean, of course, that the intervention was not prob-
lematic from a legal standpoint. After all, if deferring the election to 
the political branches was a blueprint for political disaster, it was a 
blueprint nonetheless that came directly from the Constitution.73 Su-
preme Court intervention expressly to avoid a matter within the con-
stitutional design, therefore, might be criticized as particularly activ-
ist. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the fears that political wrangling 
alone could not lead to a result that would command sufficient le-
gitimacy without Court intervention were more than simply plausi-
ble. Court intervention was likely to be necessary. 
 The constitutional crisis argument at this point, however, speaks 
only in favor of Supreme Court intervention; it does not automati-
cally support intervention favoring Bush. Such arguments are, how-
ever, available. The most obvious is that, as William Safire and oth-
ers noted, the Republicans were poised to win the eventual battle.74 
Supreme Court intervention, accordingly, would not change the re-
sult; it would only allow the country to avoid the agony that would 
otherwise occur if resort to the political branches were to follow. 
 Seen in this light, ruling for Bush was the more limited ruling be-
cause it best complied with the political realities. As Safire argued: 
Were it not for the court’s willingness to take the case and the 
heat, internecine mud-wrestling would have gone on for at least 
another month. If Gore had edged ahead in the counting of “under-
votes,” Bush would have contested unexamined “overvotes.” If the 
Florida Supremes had named a Gore slate of electors, the Florida 
Legislature would have named its own; some electors in other 
states may then have been seduced into faithlessness; ultimately, 
the ever-more-angry dispute would have wound up in Congress. At 
the end, with the G.O.P. in control of the clear majority of states, 
we would have ended up exactly where we are today: with Presi-
dent-elect Bush. Along the way, many now-reasonable opponents 
would have become implacable enemies, and the electorate would 
have been not just evenly divided but angrily polarized. The Su-
preme Court, at some cost to its own serenity but not to its historic 
reputation, saved us from that.75 
 On closer examination, however, Safire’s argument is subject to 
serious critique. First, the reason that the Florida Legislature was 
choosing its own slate was because it was intending not to honor a 
                                                                                                                    
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 74. See Safire, supra note 69, at A39. 
 75. Id. 
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judicial decision.76 If the United States Supreme Court’s decision to 
short-circuit the political process was based upon its reaction to this 
tactic, it was thus in effect giving in to (and therefore rewarding) ex-
treme political strategies.77 Indeed it would be submitting to tactics 
that were expressly designed to threaten judicial independence and 
chill judicial decisionmaking—exactly the types of actions to which 
the Supreme Court should be most wary of succumbing.78 
 Second, a closer examination of the costs in allowing the political 
processes to proceed in pursuit of an eventual Bush victory is also 
warranted. Clearly Safire is right in part.79 Animosity between the 
sides would increase as the days dragged on and the country would 
suffer polarization. The eventual Bush Presidency may also have 
been weakened and the Court may have been interested in preserv-
ing the presidential institution.80 As the Court stated in Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald,81 there is a need “to maintain prestige as an element of 
Presidential influence.”82 But assuming an eventual Bush victory, the 
most obvious losers would be the Republicans. Had the Republicans 
                                                                                                                    
 76. The November 22, 2000, statement from Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida 
House of Representatives, following the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Palm Beach 
Canvassing Board v. Harris, indicated that the legislature wanted, above all, to nullify the 
court’s decision and squelch the growing electoral din: 
 In my view, the court’s ruling indicated the tremendous lack of respect that 
the Florida Supreme Court has for the laws of the state of Florida and the 
legislature. The court continues to supplant its personal preferences over the 
statutory law of Florida, which was passed by the elected members of the legis-
lature. Yesterday, if the court had merely enforced firm and clear statutory 
deadlines, the Florida Supreme Court could have given us a resolution. In-
stead, I fear, it has given us a potential constitutional crisis.  
 The people of Florida have elected 160 members of the legislature and 
charged us with the creation and the protection of their laws. In my view, the 
judicial branch has clearly overstepped their powers. 
Federal News Service, Statement by Tom Feeney (R-FL), Speaker of the House, Florida Leg-
islature Re: Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling on Manual Recounts, Nov. 22, 2000, LEXIS 
News Group File; see also David Cox, Lawmakers Join Bush’s Case, House Speaker Tom 
Feeney Said Legislators Want Justices to Know They Might Take Action, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Nov. 25, 2000, at A14 (quoting Speaker Feeney: “The Legislature’s participation 
is intended to make the United States Supreme Court aware of the Legislature’s concerns 
and the possible consequences that may flow from the state judicial action to date.”). 
 77. See Barber & Fleming, supra note 14, at 10 (“The party that threatened institu-
tional meltdown won because it threatened institutional meltdown.”). 
 78. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida election 
procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of 
the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to 
proceed. . . . The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can 
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges through-
out the land.  
Id. 
 79. See Safire, supra note 69, at A39.  
 80. But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 81. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 82. Id. at 757. 
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strong-armed the political result by systematically rejecting a judi-
cially ordered recount, they would have risked serious political back-
lash and would have undoubtedly lost significant political capital. 
Whether the Supreme Court should have intervened to serve these 
partisan interests seems less apparent. 
 Of course, there may be an alternative explanation. There also 
may have been another constitutional crisis the Court may have 
wished to avoid. While most assume that the constitutional crisis to 
be avoided would be the political fight in Congress,83 the actual con-
stitutional crisis the Court may have wished to avoid may have been 
its own. Ruling for Bush may also have been the best way for the 
Court to protect its own institutional capital. This is because of the 
scenario that may have resulted if the recount had proceeded and a 
Gore slate was elected. In that circumstance, as noted before, there 
would likely have been two conflicting slates of electors. A divided 
Congress presumably would not have been able to decide on a vic-
tor.84 In that circumstance, federal law suggests that the governor of 
the disputed state may choose the slate of electors.85 Presumably, 
Governor Jeb Bush would choose his brother but also presumably the 
Gore forces would seek an order from the Florida courts ordering Jeb 
Bush to pick the Gore slate. The Republicans, however, were poised 
to dismiss any unfavorable decision, meaning that an order of the 
Florida court to Jeb Bush ordering him to certify the Gore slate may 
well have been ignored. The inevitable result, of course, is that the 
matter would be returned to the Supreme Court. At this point, the 
Court’s decision would have been even starker than was the one it 
faced in November and December. The Court would be asked, at con-
siderable political risk to itself, to either require Jeb Bush to certify 
the Gore slate (and thus create a Gore victory) or allow Jeb Bush to 
reject the Florida court order (and thus create a Bush victory). The 
Supreme Court, in short, would be forced to directly determine who 
would be President. Seen in this light, Bush v. Gore was not an exer-
cise in judicial courage, it was an exercise in judicial self-
preservation. 
                                                                                                                    
 83. See generally Barber & Fleming, supra note 14, at 2 (exploring the possibility 
that, given the looming chaos, Bush v. Gore amounts to an “act of judicial statesmanship”). 
 84. See, e.g., Matthew Vita & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Braces for Battle Over Elec-
toral Votes, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2000, at A19 (noting the lengthy list of obstacles to con-
gressional resolution: partisan wrangling over a potential “confrontation that members of 
both parties say they [did] not want,” widespread acknowledgement of a lack of constitu-
tional precedent, the threat that Florida’s votes might not be counted, and the possibility 
that Gore himself might preside over a joint session of Congress convened to determine the 
election’s winner); McFeatters, supra note 65, at A8 (noting that some members of Con-
gress, including then Minority Leader Tom Daschle, were “already talking about appoint-
ing a ‘blue-ribbon’ panel” rather than “send the whole mess to a deeply divided new Con-
gress”). 
 85. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). 
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B.   The Gore Forces Were Manipulating the Recount 
 The Court may have also intervened because it believed that the 
Gore forces were improperly manipulating the recount to achieve vic-
tory. In at least one sense, intervening for this purpose would seem 
less objectionable than intervening to avoid a constitutional crisis be-
cause, as noted previously, the potential crisis was a product of the 
express design of the Constitution. Intervening to prevent an injus-
tice, however, seems more in line with the motivations that may have 
led to the Court’s actions in cases like Sullivan and Henry. 
 On the other hand, intervening for this purpose did not necessar-
ily require ruling for Bush. It only required preventing any improper 
manipulation. Remember, the key problem in the way the count was 
proceeding was not that there were any colorable allegations of 
fraud. Rather, the claim was that the various counties had differing 
standards in a way that would lead to a Gore victory. An appropri-
ately fashioned remedy, however, could have easily cured this harm. 
Ordering the Florida courts to impose a uniform standard and re-
quiring that the standards be effectively policed86 would have re-
solved this potential problem.87 
 Moreover, if intervention to avoid an unjust result was truly the 
motivating force in this case, then it would seem that in addition to 
reacting to concerns about potential fraud the Court should have also 
examined where the equities of a fair resolution of this matter lay. In 
this respect, two other factors seem particularly significant. 
 First, Gore won the electoral vote count outside of Florida. Given 
the closeness of the election in Florida and the numerous ballot and 
tabulation controversies surrounding the election, any result, no 
matter how it was achieved, would be open to subsequent question.88 
In effect, no result from Florida could ever be assumed to be accu-
rate. Certainly, in balancing the equities, it would seem relevant to 
determine who would have won if the Florida votes were simply 
                                                                                                                    
 86. Given the public attention given to the ongoing vote recounts, there was likely 
very little chance that actual ballot tampering could take place. 
 87. It may also have supplied the recount process with a legitimacy the Gore forces 
desperately needed. Although there were no colorable allegations of actual fraud in the re-
count process, media attention and Republican attacks had created an impression of mal-
feasance. Supreme Court affirmation of the recount process might have done much to 
eliminate this perception. 
 88. Undoubtedly, this realization may have been a factor in the Court’s decision to put 
the matter to rest. There would be no reason to assume that any method of counting would 
be a better method in determining who won Florida than any other. Accepting the initial 
results, then, might be seen as simply adopting a default position designed to end what 
could otherwise be an endless process. But why should the happenstance of Bush’s 537-
vote lead at the time of certification be the default position? The equities of Gore winning 
the electoral vote outside of Florida, as well as likely having had more people intend to vote 
for him in Florida, would suggest that allowing a recount to proceed and, in effect, create a 
new default position may have been the fairest way to proceed. 
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taken off the table. The answer, of course, was Gore. In an election in 
which Florida’s votes are not counted, Gore wins the Presidency. 
 Second, and perhaps most importantly, virtually no one was dis-
puting that more people in Florida had intended to vote for Gore 
than for Bush. The problems with the butterfly ballot, for example, 
although not remediable through court challenge, nevertheless 
clearly indicated that many people who thought they had voted for 
Gore had actually voted for Buchanan. Adding these numbers to the 
Gore total would have clearly given him a numerical lead over Bush. 
 None of these factors (nor the fact that Gore won the popular 
vote),89 needed to lead the Court to rule that Gore had won the elec-
tion. They do, however, make a case for the argument that Gore’s los-
ing the Presidency because of fewer than 600 votes in a state where 
the election results were at best highly uncertain had profound ele-
ments of injustice. And in this respect, it is critical to reemphasize 
that the question facing the Court was not determining who had 
won. It was only whether a recount should be allowed to proceed. 
Given his electoral-vote advantage and the likelihood that more vot-
ers in Florida intended to vote for him than Bush, the equities fa-
vored at least allowing Gore the chance to establish by a more com-
plete vote count that he may have actually won Florida. 
C.   The Florida Court’s Decision Required Reversal 
 The final reason the Court may have intervened and ruled for 
Bush is because it believed the Florida Supreme Court decision was 
so lawless and unfounded that it required reversal. If this indeed was 
the reason, then the Court’s action again has pedigree. Similar con-
cerns undoubtedly influenced the Court in cases like Ward v. Love 
County90 and others in which the Supreme Court rejected a state’s 
manipulative construction of its own law in a manner designed to 
avoid federal court review and promote an unjust result.91 
                                                                                                                    
 89. Some may also suggest that the fact Gore won the national popular vote should 
also be relevant in the weighing of equities. I agree with the comments of John McGinnis 
in rejecting that view. See John O. McGinnis, Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral Col-
lege, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 995-96 (2001). The political campaigns of both parties 
were aimed at winning electoral, not popular, votes. Id. at 996. The Bush campaign, for 
example, did not need to expend campaign resources in states such as Texas, Virginia, and 
Oklahoma, because it was virtually guaranteed that he would win those states. If popular 
votes were at issue, on the other hand, his campaign would have undoubtedly chosen to 
devote time and financial resources to those states in order to maximize overall vote 
counts. Gore’s strategy with respect to motivating and turning out the vote in his safe 
states, similarly, would have changed had it been known that winning the popular vote 
would be a cognizable factor in winning the election. 
 90. 253 U.S. 17 (1920). 
 91. In the inaptly named Love County case, the state coerced American Indians to pay 
a tax from which they had claimed a federal immunity by threatening to sell their lands if 
the tax was not paid. Id. at 20. The state courts then held that the Indians were barred 
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 Protecting litigants from abusive state courts also, of course, mo-
tivated the Court in cases like Sullivan.92 The Alabama courts in that 
case were clearly acting with a political agenda93 and the United 
States Supreme Court stepped in to prevent that political agenda 
from becoming an injustice. Unlike Sullivan, however, the Court in 
Bush v. Gore may have missed a step. Concluding that a decision has 
been improperly reached does not mean its result is unjust. Even if 
the Florida court’s actions were “lawless,” an independent examina-
tion of whether its result was nevertheless unjust would seem neces-
sary before reversal—particularly if the Court’s guiding principle 
was “rough justice.” 
 Certainly, as with the decision of the Supreme Court, the opinion 
of the Florida Supreme Court in Gore v. Harris was not a model of 
clarity or judicial craftsmanship. It may be soundly criticized on nu-
merous points including, most tellingly, for its creation of a new 
deadline for which the counties must certify their results to the Sec-
retary of State.94 However, the conclusion that the Florida court’s de-
cision was not soundly based in legal doctrine does not necessarily 
mean that it should be reversed. For example, Judge Posner excuses 
the doctrinal weaknesses of the United States Supreme Court opin-
ion on the grounds that it may have involved a “judgment in advance 
of doctrine,” by which he means that the Court may have understood 
which direction it should go before it worked out the legal niceties of 
how to get there.95 But the same might be said about the decision of 
the Florida Supreme Court. If the United States Supreme Court was 
empowered to try and effectuate rough justice, why should the same 
not be true for the Florida Supreme Court? If the United States Su-
preme Court should be excused from authoring an opinion not 
soundly based on legal doctrine, why should the Florida Supreme 
Court also not be similarly excused? 
                                                                                                                    
from challenging the legality of the tax because they had paid it “voluntarily.” Id. at 21. 
The Supreme Court rejected the sham and held that the Indians’ ability to challenge the 
tax was not foreclosed. Id. at 24-25. Love County is a powerful example of the Court’s abil-
ity to pierce the veil of a lower court decision in order to prevent the state court from ma-
nipulating its own law in order to shield itself from constitutional scrutiny. 
 92. See SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 44-45. 
 93. See id. Any criticism of the Florida Supreme Court for acting on partisan grounds 
must be tempered by the fact that in key cases the Court actually ruled for Bush when 
holding otherwise would have inevitably led to a Gore victory. Conversely, its decision in 
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), only gave Gore the chance of eventually pre-
vailing through a recount. For example, a favorable decision for Gore on the butterfly bal-
lots (including a statistically based remedy) could have resulted in the switch of enough 
votes from the Buchanan column to the Gore column to sway the election. 
 94. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 628-29. “I am aware of no general principle of equity 
that would allow a court to ride roughshod over a particular time limitation contained in a 
statute in favor of its own alternative date.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 95. POSNER, supra note 7, at 23. 
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 The Court, in short, also had the option to rehabilitate the Florida 
court’s opinion, as well as to reverse it. And there were numerous 
avenues through which salvaging the Florida decision may have been 
possible. First, the Court could have been more deferential to the 
Florida court’s efforts at statutory construction.96 Indeed even if the 
Court disagreed with the Florida court’s statutory construction ef-
forts, it could have remanded for clarification.97 Most importantly, 
the Court could have concluded that it was permissible for the Flor-
ida court to inform its statutory construction by reference to constitu-
tional principles.98 This would not be amending the law as the con-
curring opinion suggests,99 rather it would be assuming, as is gener-
ally true in statutory construction, that laws are enacted with the 
legislative intent that it should be construed consistently with consti-
tutional provisions.100 Finally, the Court could have refused to be so 
hasty in determining that a recount could not proceed because of the 
alleged importance of the “safe harbor” provision to the construction 
of Florida law. At the least, the Court could have remanded the case 
to Florida to ascertain whether Florida law required a cessation of 
the vote count in order to comply with the safe harbor provision.101 
                                                                                                                    
 96. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 752 (“The Florida Supreme Court decision that was 
overturned in Bush v. Gore was consistent with the plain language of the principal statute 
involved—the Florida statute governing contests of election certifications—and neither the 
concurring opinion nor, as far as I am aware, anyone else, has seriously contended other-
wise.”).  
 It is also notable that the Florida court’s expansion of the certification deadline—
arguably its most jurisprudentially criticized action—was an action that did not meaning-
fully affect the legal interests of candidate Bush. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a 
Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 667-69 (noting that the certification 
deadline is “not absolute” because it merely represents the end of the “pre-certification” pe-
riod, and that as such the Florida Supreme Court’s deadline extension did not prevent 
“disenfranchisement” but rather had the “perverse” effect of adding “twelve days to a phase 
that had no real legal significance,” at the expense of the contest period, “the time for ob-
taining genuine legal relief ” ). 
 97. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
 98. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (pointing out that under the broad equal pro-
tection principles espoused in Bush v. Gore, “manual recounts might even seem 
constitutionally compelled”). 
 99. See Bush v. Gore, 31 U.S. 98, 118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he 
[Florida] court’s interpretation of ‘legal vote,’ and hence its decision to order a contest-
period recount, plainly departed from the legislative scheme.”). 
 100. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 749.  
The Florida Supreme Court did not declare that something the legislature had 
done was unconstitutional under the state constitution. At worst, the Florida 
Supreme Court relied on the state constitution for general principles of a kind 
that could easily be seen as part of the background against which the legisla-
ture knowingly enacted the Florida election laws—which is how the Florida 
Supreme Court explained its opinion on remand.  
Id. 
 101. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 767-68. 
 [The U.S. Supreme Court] concluded that as a matter of Florida law, a con-
tinuation of the manual recount “could not be part of an ‘appropriate’ order au-
thorized by” Florida law.  
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 In fact three reasons would indicate that the Court should have 
deferred to the state court if at all possible. First, general federalism 
principles would suggest that the Court defer to the Florida court. 
Inelegant as its opinion may have been, the Florida Supreme Court 
was, after all, ultimately attempting to discern Florida law. Second, 
judicial comity would argue in favor of respecting a judicial decision 
rather than joining with those claiming that the judicial enterprise 
was illegitimate.102 Third, and most importantly, the Florida Su-
preme Court decision was guided by the animating principle that all 
votes should be counted. This principle not only resonates in what 
may be “rough justice,” it also resonates in the Constitution and in 
the essential vision of democracy. The animating principle of the 
United States Supreme Court in holding for Bush, on the other hand, 
is both far less clear and far less compelling. None of the rationales 
offered in defense of the Court’s decision would seem to overcome the 
straightforward principle relied on by the Florida Supreme Court. 
The Florida court, in short, may have had the better sense of rough 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
 Bush v. Gore may be easily condemned for its doctrinal and theo-
retical shortcomings. These condemnations, however, miss the essen-
tial point. The case was not one about doctrine. Rather it was about 
rough justice. As such, the case was neither illegitimate nor unprece-
dented. Exceptional cases may demand exceptional solutions and 
Bush v. Gore was undoubtedly an exceptional case. 
                                                                                                                    
 This was a blunder. It is true that the Florida Supreme Court had empha-
sized the importance, for the Florida Legislature, of the safe harbor provision. 
But the Florida courts had never been asked to say whether they would inter-
pret Florida law to require a cessation in the counting of votes, if the conse-
quence of the counting would be to extend the choice of electors past December 
12. In fact the Florida Court’s pervasive emphasis on the need to ensure the in-
clusion of lawful votes would seem to indicate that if a choice must be made be-
tween the safe harbor and the inclusion of votes, the latter might have priority. 
It is not easy to explain the United States Supreme Court’s failure to allow the 
Florida Supreme Court to consider this issue of Florida law. 
Id.; Strauss, supra note 5, at 742.  
 At the very least, it was uncertain what the Florida Supreme Court would 
have said if forced to choose between the safe harbor and continued counting. 
In the face of any uncertainty about the Florida Legislature’s intentions, for the 
United States Supreme Court to attribute such an unlikely intention to the 
Florida Legislature without even remanding, to see what the Florida Supreme 
Court would say, is inexplicable—unless, of course, the United States Supreme 
Court simply did not trust the Florida Supreme Court to play it straight. 
Id. 
 102. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court 
sided with those attacking judicial legitimacy). 
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 That the Court may have reached its eventual result by applying 
its own notions of rough justice thus should not be conclusive in 
evaluating the integrity of the decision. It does, however, suggest 
that the opinion may properly be held up to an examination of 
whether the decision actually effectuated the justice it was purport-
edly designed to serve. It is with respect to that inquiry, however, 
that the case comes up short. The ostensible motivating factors un-
derlying the Court’s decision, avoiding a prolonged constitutional cri-
sis, preventing improper vote manipulation, and/or reversing an os-
tensibly lawless opinion, do not stand up under close scrutiny. The 
first rationale turns out primarily to be abdication to extremist po-
litical tactics. The second concern is a matter that could be resolved 
by judicial remedy. The third is little more than the pot calling the 
kettle. Both the United States and the Florida Supreme Courts were 
engaged in the same endeavor. Both were beleaguered courts at-
tempting to achieve a fair and just result out of an impossible set of 
circumstances. Both issued opinions that were substantially less 
than legally compelling. 
 The Florida court’s opinion, however, did have one relative virtue. 
Its animating principle, counting the votes, was clear and fundamen-
tal. Accordingly, when evaluating Bush v. Gore and its relationship 
to rough justice, it may be that the United States Supreme Court 
opinion was the one that should have been reversed. 
